Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 **Exhibit** 18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3

EXHIBIT A (part 2) - SRC Claim Pg 1 of 35 46 Document #:51-1 Filed: 03/11/16 Page 9 of 17 Page to #(250)



Don't worry. This isn't a bill. It's confirmation of your Protection Agreement coverage.

0334550422 00065 N. Greene

5 Saint Davids Rd. # N. Wayne, PA 19087-4756

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1/JLAN 26 M - 2008

CERTIFICATE NUMBER 033455042200065

CREDIT CARD NUMBER

EXPIRATION* 11/21/2008

PRODUCT	MODEL NUMBER	SERVICE LOCATION	PURCHASE DATE
**REFRIGERATOR, W/ICE MAKER	501R	IN-HOME	01/01/1994 -
***COMPACTOR **TREADMILL. POWER		IN-HOME IN-HOME	01/01/1995 01/01/1995
**FREEZER, ÖVER 9 CU. FT.	501F	IN-HOME	01/01/1996
DISHWASHÉR, BUILT-IN DISHWASHÉR, BUILT-IN		ÎN-HÔMĒ IN-HÔMĒ	10/01/1998 10/01/2001
WASHER FRONT LOAD PREM	11044932200	IN-HOME	10/14/2003

Price: \$1,786.29 Tax Paid: \$72.62 Total Paid: \$1,858.91 To schedule a repair, please call

1-800-4-MY-HOME

1-800-469-4663 or go online at www.sears.com.

** This item will continue to be covered by Sears until the original contracts' expiration date.

Unit #: 0009420 Printed: 11/23/04 MPA TIOTOI

18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 Exhibit

EXHIBIT A (part 2) - SRC Claim Pg 2 of 35.46 Pocumbater Potentialed Broshed 16 Page 40 of

SEARS

Don't worry. This isn't a bill. It's confirmation of your coverage.

> CERTIFICATE NUMBER 033455042200067

CREDIT CARD NUMBER

EXPIRATION*

PRODUCT OYEN, BUILT-IN DRYENG, PREM PLUS MODEL NUMBER

11094832200

SERVICE LOCATION
IN-HOME
IN-HOME

PURCHASE DATE 05/20/1998 10/14/2003

Price: \$248.08 Tax Paid: \$0.52 Total Paid: \$248.60 To schedule a repair, please call

I - 8 0 0 - 4 - M Y - H O M E

1-800-469-4663 or go online at www.sears.com.

Unit #: 0009903 Printed: 06/28/05 MPA TIOTOI * * MPA 18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29

EXHIBIT A (parts 2) PROTECTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PROTECTIO

COVERAGE AND TERM. We will directly pay on your behalf for the cost of parts and services performed by a quodified report provider that we shall designable (collectively referred to herein or "Sears Report") in reagnism the proper operating condition for the product(s) listed on the reverse rode, and under any warron'ny or moult active to normal been and feet. The commencement table, expiration dobe and tated pace ("Disal Prints") of this MPA are shown on the reverse size. Parts and service covered under any warron'ny or moultacturer's rocall will be producted under that undergrap or product(s) may be either new or rebuild on non-original manufacturer's parts, an our option. Products including those within the original manufacturer's ourself perioder, or we will issue a woulder for the replacement purchase prints at our discretion. You will exceive this MPA certificate writing that of purchase. There are some limitations to reverge which are set forth in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 below.

LittlifellIT FOR COVERAGE. You represent that the product(s) listed on the reverse side is in proper operating condition at the start of coverage only the information related to "Date Parchased" on the reverse side is correct. Any product(s) which do not meet these inspirements are not covered under this MPA. We reserve the right to impact the product(s) listed on the reverse side is determine eligibility for coverage. Coverage applies only to product(s) which do not meet these products of the coverage applies only to product(s) which do not meet these products of the coverage applies only to product(s) which do not meet these products of the coverage product. The NAS is transferable to only subsequent owners of the coverage product in the covera

not covered by this MPA

1. NHE AND FLACE Service will be performed during the Sears Repair provider's normal braness hours. If, due to the loss of the use of your product, your health or safety is endangered or if diamage to or service where your product is located, cell 1-800-44-MY-HOME® at any time. For service on computers and other hame office opuppings, cell 1-800-877-8701. On some products, telephone support by a technician will be are notice on any will be required to check some operational functions and be given possible voluments are technician is dispatched to your home. If the reverse solds of this certificate indicates Sing Service, you must be that they are productly to a Sears Repair lectation and park if up following complained service. In some cases, you will be provided pox logging and you must shap the covered product to our services, for our terms, for repair for select types of merchanduse, we may framiliar covered graduat. If the product is covered by on se-home agreement.

IMPLATIONS OF COVERAGE, THIS MPA DOES NOT. COVER.

O may product located outside the United States and Poeria Rico. Service is available in Conndo provided you have obtained a Hydro Commission CSA certificate for the product(s) at your expense.

b. only form and garden, goodine powered or gas grill product.

c. only form and garden, goodine powered or gas grill product.

c. only form and garden, goodine powered or gas grill product.

c. only form and garden, goodine powered or gas grill product.

c. only form and garden, goodine powered or gas grill product or goodine powers than single family hospitally computer equipment or power sed product used for only business or commercial purposes. All products are grill product in the product production of the period pr

- 11 SAFEY. In the event that Seats Repoil determines that it connot service your covered unit(s) the in-poor recessibility or unuse working conditions or that it connot restore your covered unit(s) to safe, working conditions, or that it connot restore your covered unit(s) to safe, working conditions, or that it connot restore your covered unit(s) to safe, working conditions, one or that complex with the remarkative respectively. The manufacturer's published your covered unit(s) to deviations, may one or necessarially respect to the properties of the requirement, including the failure to place the equipment, including the failure to place the equipment of the equipment, including the failure to place the equipment of the equipment, including the failure to place the equipment of the equipment, including the failure to place the equipment, including the failure to place the equipment of the equipment, including the failure to place the equipment of the equipment, including the failure to place the equipment of the equi

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SEARS

Don't worry. This isn't a bill. It's confirmation of your coverage.

> CERTIFICATE NUMBER 033455042200070

CREDIT CARD NUMBER

EXPIRATION*

PRODUCT COOKTOP

MODEL NUMBER

SERVICE LOCATION

PURCHASE DATE

Price: \$236.60 Tax Paid: \$14.20 Total Paid: \$250.80 To schedule a repair, please call

I - 8 0 0 - 4 - M Y - H O M E

I-800-469-4663 or go online at www.sears.com.

Unit #: 0009468 Printed: 06/28/05 MPA TIOTOI * * MPA

18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29

EXHIBIT A (parts/g) not some of the control of the

COVERNE END TERM. We will directly poy on your behalf for the cost of ports and services performed by a quelified repair provider that we shall designate (collectively referred to herein as "Sears Ream") areas my to maintain the proper operating condition for the product(clined on the reverse side, including repair necessary due to normal user and term. The contentmentment date, expiration and are related price ("Dut) Price" of this MPA are shown on the reverse side. Forth and service covered under any wort only or maintain their is recall with the provided under their treatmenty or receil. Purh used to repair and of variously product(s) may be either new or rebetle product or replicational protections give at one of discretion. For which their productions give at one of discretion. For which their productions give at one of discretion. For which their productions give at one of discretions to reverse which are set forth in perhapsions of 10, 11 and 12 below.

Elistation for Coverage of the representation of the three productions of the reverse side is correct. Any product(s) which do not meet these requirements are not covered under this MPA. We reserve the right to inspect the product(s) listed on the reverse side to the terminal production of the start of coverage opeles cally to product(s) which are located at one (1) address.

PREVENTING MAINTERIANC. At your remains, we will directly pay Sear Repair to perform one (1) preventive maintenance chock-up within any continuous teacher (12) month period that the product(s) are covered that it transferable to any subsequent owner of the covered product (s), subject to the terms and conditions of this MPA.

PREVENTING MAINTERIANCE. At your remains, we will directly pay Sear Repair to perform one (1) preventive maintenance chock-up within any continuous teacher (12) month period that the product(s) are covered that in the result of a mechanical failer of any to overed product. The food loss must be verified by us. If the covered product is sufficiently to perform on

us at our sofe discretion.

REFIAR KININGESTAREM In the creat that you will be enthus your concret product(s) due to a covered epign for a period of time that is longer than our original promised completion date, we will reimburse you for recreationable rental expenses of a competcible product for a period of time from one (1) day after the original promise due and the report is completed. For in-home service, original promised completion date is the first date that a technism is straighted to arrive to perform service. All reimbursements for rental expenses must be pro-authorized, and require expenses of original receipts from an approved vendor along with some interest. It is served expenses of a completed claim force. It is served expenses in the control of 1-300-927-7836.

DEFOUNT ON NON-COVERED REPAIRS. On the covered product(s), you are control to a 10% discount off the regular retail price on any service performed, and related installed parts, provided by Sears Repair that is

8 DISCOUNT ON ROM-COVERED REPIAIS. On the covered product(s), you are connect to a non-association requires a process any section of the loss of the use of your product, your health or safety is endangered or if damage to at less of your property in throatened, we will make our best effort to expectle service. To arrange for service where your product is founded, cell 1-800-4-MY-HOME® of any hare. For service on computer, and there have been producted to the service on the computer of any hard. For service on computer, and the more office equipment, cell 1-800-877-8701. On some product theighness upper they or fatherism will be cronicable and you will be required to these some operations for theighness cord be given possible address on the given product to the service and operations of the given possible address of the given possible

a may product ioxated outside the United States and Puerto Rico. Service is available in Cennatu provided you have obtained a Hydro Commission (SA certificate for the product's) at your expense.

In any force state, give the product of the produc

- 15 SAFEY. In the avent that Seers Repair determines that it cannot service your covered units) to sole, working conditions on that it cannot restore your covered units) to sole, working conditions to the restore beyond the rope of this Agreement, such as four not limited to look violations, improper storage, instellation, use or movement of the equipment, including the fedure to place the equipment on area that complies with the manufactures results and control equipment in a required to proceed with the covered report(s) and type unamenty the applicable hazard.

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

- MRAY DELAY IN SERVICES ON THE INABILITY IN SERVICE AND COVERED PARADULE (15).

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 CARELLAND AND REFUNDS. You may care did not very time for any reason by mailing written notice of cancellation for Covered units MRA if you led to pay, make a material managementality have been concessed in an under sealing another management of the MRA is you led to pay, make a material managemental party of the data received, or part to the appropriate his in compared to the product, we will refund the fold Price. If this MRA is concelled by you or or within the MRA is concelled by you or or within the MRA is concelled by you or or within the MRA is concelled by you or or within the MRA is concelled by you or or within the MRA is concelled by you or or within the MRA is concelled by you or or within the MRA is concelled by the product of the data received, or part to the appropriate of the data received, or part to the appropriate of the data received, or part to the appropriate of the data received, or part to the appropriate of the product, we will refund the fold Price. If this MRA is concelled by the management of the data received, or part to the appropriate of the product of the management of the data received, or part to the appropriate of the data received, or part to the appropriate of the data received, or part to the part to the fold of the management of the data received of the data received of the part to the fold of the management of the data received of the

and Returned's provisions above. Unth residents will receive theirty (30) days prior vention notice of concellation. There is no dealy tible applied for the performance of this control. Any motiter in dispute between you and Oiligings while the subject to arbitration on an alternative to court action pursuant to the rules of NAF or IAMS and the arbitration award may include alternacy's fees in allowed by state law used may be stated to a yedgement in any court of proper jeriodicism.

19. KEPILOKY AND VIRENIA LOSTOMASS. If we fail to pay any valid claim within sixty (60) days, you may make a claim directly applied for the performance Company of America, Science Prizzo, Scientific, WA 88185.

19. HOBANA AND WIST YIRGWIA CUSTOMASS. The Agreement is not on insurance layer and is not regulated by the Department of Lorumerce. Companys for the states of Indiana and West Virginia.

19. INVA. CUSTOMASS. Any questions recreating the regulation of us under this Agreement of any unresolved compliants (within sixty (60) days of groot of loss) may be directed to the Science Department of Lorumerce of the performance of the perform

SEARS

0334550422 00076 Nina Greene 5 Saint Davids Rd. Wayne, PA 19087-4756 Don't worry. This isn't a bill. It's confirmation of your coverage.

CERTIFICATE NUMBER 033455042200076

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CREDIT CARD NUMBER

EXPIRATION* 11/21/2008

PRODUCT DISHWASHER, IYR, 0800/U1300 MODEL NUMBER 666KUDS02SKWH

SERVICE LOCATION

PURCHASE DATE

Price: \$199.19 Tax Paid: \$0.00 Total Paid: \$199.19 To schedule a repair, please call

| - 8 0 0 - 4 - M Y - H 0 M E
| 1-800-469-4663 or go online at www.sears.com.

Unit #: 0009420 Printed: 1/3/06 MPA REPLOT ** MPA

L8-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 Exhib EXHIBIT A (part 2) SPC Claim Pg 7 of 35 Case: 1:15-cv-02546 Document # 54 4 Filed: 53/11/16 Page 15 of 17 PageID #:256 18-23538-shl

In this Moster Protection Agreement thereing the relevand to as "MAT" or "Agreement", the terms "we," "us," "our" not "Obligat" true; to Sears Frotection Company ("SK"), a wholly owned subadiary of Sears, Reckurk and Go, ("Sears"), in states where Skit is the Obligat, Sears in other sheet Sears is the Obligat, Sears from Improvement Products and Services, Inc. "ISIR"), a wholly owned subadiary of Sears, Reckurk, and Co, in states where Skit is the Obligat, Sears from Improvement Products and Services, Inc. "ISIR"), a wholly owned subadiary of Sears, in Presto Rico. The terms "you" and "you" relat to the partners of this MPA.
Obligations under this Agreement are busked only by the full faith and aredit of the Obligat. See paragraph 16 for state by state Obligat lesting. SEE ALSO SPECIAL STATE EXCLUSIONS BELOW.

- in addition where SHIP if the Obligion, and Seen Stackbook did Pours Rice, Inc. ("Soots PPT"), a wholly connect subsidiary of Sears, in Pourto Rice. The terms "not" and "yout" relate to the packmark of this MPA.

 (OVENISE AND ISBN. We will directly port on your behalf for the cool of purish and service performed by a qualified report; provider that or we find the signost (total event for the terms and the property product) listed on the reverse side, individing repois necessary you at normal year and the independent confidence in the products) listed on the reverse side, individing repois necessary you at normal year and the forther to the products of the reposition of the products of the product of the products of the reposition of the products of the reposition of the product of the product of the reposition of the product of the product of the product of the reposition of the product of the product of the product of the reposition of the product of

- 10 LIMITATIONS OF COPERAGE. THIS MEN BOTS NOT COPER.

 a my product levered outside the United Sizes and Peerfor Rica Service is available in Canada provided you have chinined a hydro Commercial purposes. A product for the product of your read grader, gradian provided in grading product or gradian provided in gradianty of the product used for any business or commercial purposes. A product is 'used for business or commercial purposes, and product survey for any purpose other than single from hy household purposes. All products survey for any purpose other than single from hy household purposes, and products of any purpose other than single from hy household purposes. All products controlled the product is used from any purpose other than single from hy household or any purpose of the mineral product or controlled by a Seas southward installer and no modifications to the original installer and to make the product or controlled the product or controlled to any purpose which is dominated or mailtraining due to cause they appear out or controlled to the purpose of the product or controlled to any purpose which is dominated or the equipment or require any other requires the product or controlled to any purpose of any purpose which is the purpose of the
- ANTI-PUBLICATION DESCRIPTION TO SALARS COST TIME CONSIDERATE OF A MAN CONTRACTION OF A MAN CO

Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Exhibit EXHIBIT A (part 2) - SRC Claim Pg 8 of 35 46 Document #: 51-1 Filed: 03/11/16 Page 16 of 17 PageID #:257 Master Protection Agreement Don't worry. This isn't a bill. It's confirmation of your coverage. ************************AUTO***3-DIGIT 190 0334550422 00086 Nina Greene 5 Saint Davids Rd. Wayne, PA 19087-4756 հայիկականականի այստանականությունների CERTIFICATE NUMBER 033455042200086 CREDIT CARD NUMBER CONTRACT EXPIRATION* 11/21/2011 MODEL NUMBER PRODUCT REFRIGERAJOR, WACE MAKER COMPACTOR IREADMILL POWER SERVICE LOCATION PURCHASE DATE FOR OVER P CU. FT.
BUILT-IN
ANDER, BUILT-IN
ER FRONT LOAD PREM
IG. PAEM PLUS
VASHER, IVA, OBOU/JU1300 CT23OW |1944937200 |1994837200 |666KEDS025RWH

Price: \$2,563.15 To
Tax Paid: \$150.74 I - 8 0
Total Paid: \$2,713.89 I-800-469See reverse side for terms and conditions.
* May reflect any warranty and current Service Agreement coverage.

To schedule a repair, please call

1-800-4-MY-HOME

i-800-469-4663 or go online at www.sears.com.

Unit #: 0009480 Printed: 11/25/09 MPA TIOTOI * > MPA 18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 Exhibit

EXHIBIT A (part 2) - SRC Claim Pg 9 of 35

Case: 1:15-ev-02546 Document #: 51-1 Filed: 03/11/16 Page 17 of 17 PageID #:258

Master Protection Agreement



0334550422 00088 Nina Greene 5 Saint Davids Rd **WAYNE, PA 19087**

Don't worry. This isn't a bill. It's confirmation of your coverage.

CONTRACT
NUMBER
033455042200088


PRODUCT OVEN BUILT-IN TGI ONLY COOKTOP TGI ONLY REFRIGERATOR, WACE MAKER COMPACTOR FREEZR, FULL SIZE TGI ONLY FRONT LOAD WASHER DRYERG, PREM PLUS DISHWASHER, BUILT-IN DISHWASHER,1YR,0800/U1300 VACUUM CLNR, CANNISTER VACUUM CLNR, CANNISTER

PAYMENT METHOD

CONTRACT EXPIRATION*

	01/12/1	4
MODEL NUMBER CT230W	SERVICE LOCATION IN-HOME	PURCHASE DATE 05/20/98
VERIFY	IN-HOME	01/01/96
501R	IN-HOME	02/20/94
NA	IN-HOME	01/02/95
501F	IN-HOME	02/20/96
11044932200	IN-HOME	10/14/03
11094832201	IN-HOME	10/14/03
G8855C1	IN-HOME	10/01/98
666KUDSD2SRWH	IN-HOME	12/07/05
CV850	SHOP	04/26/07
CV850	SHOP	04/26/07

Alex classo Customur Solutionio Case # 6057529



Price: \$3,984.80 Tax Paid: \$234.05 Total Paid: \$4,218.85

To schedule a repair, please call 1-800-4-MY-HOME

1-800-469-4663 or go online at www.sears.com. See reverse side for terms and conditions.

"May reflect any warranty and current Service Agreement coverage.

Unit # 009468 Printed: 05/11/12 MPA TIOTO1

EXHIBIT 2

18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 EXHIBIT A (part 2) - SRC Claim Pg 11 of 35 Case: 1:15-cv-02546 Document #: 121 Filed: 03/27/17 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:1408

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

NINA GREENE and GERALD GREENE,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	No. 15 C 2546
V.)	
)	Judge Jorge L. Alonso
SEARS PROTECTION COMPANY,)	
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., and)	
SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Counts III and IV of plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint as well as defendant Sears Holdings Corporation [54], which is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons explained below. Also before the Court are plaintiffs' objections [116] to Magistrate Judge Mason's rulings on two of plaintiffs' discovery motions, which are overruled for the reasons explained below.

BACKGROUND

In this action, plaintiffs Nina Greene and Gerald Greene, who are Pennsylvania residents, complain that from 1994 to 2014, they entered into and paid for several appliance-service agreements with the Sears, Roebuck and Company and Sears Protection Company that did not actually cover the service on their products. Plaintiffs also sue Sears Holdings Corporation ("Sears Holdings"). Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' previous complaint was granted in part and denied in part. The Court granted the motion as to Sears Holdings and dismissed it from this suit. The Court also granted the motion as to plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment 18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 Exhibit EXHIBIT A (part 2) - SRC Claim Pg 12 of 35 Case: 1:15-cv-02546 Document #: 121 Filed: 03/27/17 Page 2 of 10 PageID #:1409

and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act ("ICFA"), which were dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed the First Amended Class Action Complaint, which asserts claims for breach of contract (Count I); unjust enrichment (Count II); violation of the ICFA (Count III); and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("PCPL") (Count IV). (ECF No. 51, Compl.)

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Legal Standards

When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court construes it in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepts as true all well-pleaded facts therein, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. *Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer*, 722 F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2013). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations" but must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556).

2. Sears Holdings Corporation

The Court previously dismissed Sears Holdings as a defendant because plaintiffs' allegations established that it was not a party to the service agreements and plaintiffs offered no other basis for holding it liable. That remains the case with the amended complaint. Plaintiffs argue that they have stated unjust enrichment and consumer fraud claims against Sears Holdings.

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The Court disagrees. Although plaintiffs have added allegations about Sears Holdings' employees' general involvement in drafting, pricing, marketing, and handling claims related to service protection agreements, as well as Sears Holdings' operation of call centers that handle questions about products and services, plaintiffs do not allege any facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that Sears Holdings retained any benefit as a result of plaintiffs' agreements. Plaintiffs therefore fail to state an unjust enrichment claim against Sears Holdings. See Galvan v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 888 N.E.2d 529, 541-42 (III. App. Ct. 2008) (affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment claim where plaintiff did not allege that defendant had unjustly retained any benefit).

As for the consumer fraud claims, plaintiffs fail to allege any facts from which it can be inferred that Sears Holdings, in particular, made any misrepresentations to them or otherwise engaged in deceptive practices. Accordingly, plaintiffs also fail to state consumer fraud claims against Sears Holdings. See Lagen v. Balcor Co., 653 N.E.2d 968, 976-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (stating that a plaintiff must "allege some sort of deception by the defendant to avoid dismissal" of an ICFA claim); Garczynski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (dismissing PCPL claim against mortgage lender where the only misrepresentation plaintiffs alleged was by a different defendant and the claim against the lender was merely a threadbare recital of the claim's elements). The Court therefore dismisses Sears Holdings as a defendant. Defendants seek a with-prejudice dismissal. Because plaintiffs do not seek leave to amend in the event of Sears Holdings' dismissal, and plaintiff were previously given the opportunity to replead claims against Sears Holdings and still have failed to do so, the dismissal is with prejudice. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012) (leave to amend need not be granted when a party has had multiple opportunities to amend but failed to cure a defective claim).

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3. Count III (Illinois Consumer Fraud Act)

As the Court set out in its previous opinion and order, the Seventh Circuit has said that a nonresident plaintiff may sue under the ICFA only if the circumstances relating to the alleged fraudulent transaction occurred mostly in Illinois. *Crichton v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.*, 576 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing *Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 835 N.E.2d 801, 853-54 (Ill. 2005)). The Court dismissed plaintiffs' ICFA claim, noting that it was alleged or reasonable to infer from the allegations that although Sears is in Illinois, plaintiffs live in Pennsylvania; they entered into the agreements with Sears and thus were allegedly deceived in Pennsylvania; they called from Pennsylvania to request service on their treadmill; they were in Pennsylvania when they learned that their products were not covered by the agreements; and the appliances that were the subject of the agreements are in Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 48, Mem. Op. & Order at 6.) Because the allegations suggested that most of the circumstances underlying the alleged fraud occurred in Pennsylvania, the Court concluded that plaintiffs do not have statutory standing to sue under the ICFA.

In the First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs add allegations about general operations and procedures concerning service agreements, which take place at Sears's headquarters in Illinois. Much of the alleged conduct (such as the handling of claims under the agreements and the maintenance of databases used to input customer claims) has nothing to do with the allegedly deceptive conduct, and the remaining alleged conduct is not specific to plaintiffs; as defendants point out, none of plaintiffs' new allegations address the circumstances under which plaintiffs purchased their service agreements or when they learned that their purchases were not covered. The new allegations at most support an inference that the alleged deceptive course of conduct emanated from Illinois, but that is insufficient to support an ICFA claim. *See Avery*, 835 N.E.2d

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at 855 (no ICFA claim where the only connection with Illinois is the defendants' headquarters or the fact that a scheme "emanated" from Illinois). Plaintiffs' allegations still suggest that most of the circumstances underlying the alleged fraud occurred in Pennsylvania, so plaintiffs do not have standing to sue under the ICFA. The dismissal of plaintiffs' ICFA claim will be with prejudice, for the same reasons the dismissal of Sears Holdings Corporation is with prejudice.

4. Count IV (Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law)

Defendants contend that plaintiffs also have failed to state a claim under the PCPL, for two reasons. The first, say defendants, is that plaintiffs do not allege that they justifiably relied on defendants' wrongful conduct and suffered harm as a result of that reliance. The parties disagree on whether Pennsylvania law requires plaintiffs to plead (or even prove) justifiable reliance when asserting a PCPL claim under the statute's "catch-all" provision. The Court will assume for purposes of the instant motion that the plaintiffs are so required. According to defendants, plaintiffs fail to allege that Sears's deceptive acts induced plaintiffs to purchase service agreements, to their detriment.

Plaintiffs respond that they have pleaded justifiable reliance because the only reasonable inference to draw from their allegations is that they purchased the service agreements based on the belief, caused by Sears's misrepresentations and omissions, that the agreements actually provided coverage for the products they had purchased. The Court agrees. Justifiable reliance requires considering, among other things, the circumstances surrounding the transaction at issue. See, e.g., Behr v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 1:14-cv-291, 2015 WL 5123656, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 2015). Here we do not have a situation, as in some cases, where the nature of the subject transaction and alleged deception permit alternative inferences as to whether a plaintiff relied on the deception in entering into the transaction. As plaintiffs correctly note, the

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only competing inference—that plaintiffs entered into the agreements without regard for whether they actually covered their products—is implausible. The Court concludes that plaintiffs have pleaded facts sufficient to allege justifiable reliance.

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs' PCPL claim is barred by the economic-loss doctrine, which prohibits plaintiffs from recovering in tort certain economic losses. Whether the doctrine applies to PCPL claims "has been the subject of much dispute in Pennsylvania." *Murphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, No. 16-2922, 2016 WL 4917597, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2016). The parties' briefs reflect this dispute, which the *Murphy* court explained as follows:

While . . . the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether the economic loss doctrine bars intentional fraud and deceptive practices claims stemming from a statute such as the UTPCPL, the Third Circuit has predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that UTPCPL claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine. Werwinski [v. Ford Motor Co.], 286 F.3d [661,] 680-81 [(3d Cir. 2002)]. After Werwinski, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held in Knight v. Springfield Hyundai, 81 A.3d 940, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), that UTPCPL claims are not subject to the economic loss doctrine because they are statutory claims that do not sound in negligence.

Murphy, 2016 WL 4917597, at *5. As noted in Murphy, while some courts have concluded that Werwinski "no longer holds vitality after Knight," others, such as the Murphy court, have continued to follow Werwinski on the ground that it is binding on district courts in the Third Circuit until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the Third Circuit rules otherwise. See id.

Werwinski is not binding on this Court, and in the absence of guiding decisions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit instructs us to "consult and follow the decisions of intermediate appellate courts unless there is a convincing reason to predict the state's highest court would disagree." ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. Dist., 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012). Because defendants do not persuade this Court that there is a

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convincing reason that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would disagree with the Pennsylvania Superior Court's conclusion in Knight, the Court will follow Knight. Although defendants are correct in stating that when faced with two opposing and equally plausible interpretations of state law, this court should generally choose a narrower interpretation that restricts liability, see Home Valu, Inc. v. Pep Boys, 213 F.3d 960, 965 (7th Cir. 2000), it is this Court's view that Knight is the more plausible interpretation in light of the evolution of Pennsylvania law since Werwinski was decided, see Kantor v. Hiko Energy, LLC, 100 F. Supp. 3d 421, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2015). Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' PCPL claim is therefore denied.

B. Objections to Judge Mason's Rulings

Plaintiffs timely filed objections to Magistrate Judge Mason's Order of October 28, 2016 [115], in which Judge Mason granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motions to compel production of certain discovery [110] and to extend discovery deadlines [109].

Where, as here, a district court considers timely objections to a magistrate judge's rulings on nondispositive matters, the magistrate judge's rulings will be modified or set aside only if they are "clearly erroneous or . . . contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also Domanus v. Lewicki, 742 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 2014). Under the clear-error standard of review, "the district court can overturn the magistrate judge's ruling only if the district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiffs challenge three aspects of Judge Mason's order.1 The first is the denial of plaintiffs' motion to reopen fact discovery for a ninety-day period following the filing of an

¹Because oral argument would not help the Court in ruling on plaintiffs' objections, plaintiffs' request for oral argument is denied.

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answer. Judge Mason concluded that plaintiffs' motion to reopen fact discovery was untimely and unsupported by law. Plaintiffs first argue, unpersuasively, that they experienced "confusion" about whether fact discovery was closed on June 10, 2016. To support that proposition, they oddly rely on an order that Judge Mason entered a month later in which he indeed affirmed that he did not find it necessary to "re-open" fact discovery. (ECF No. 91 (emphasis added).) The Court agrees with Judge Mason that it was clear that the statements he made with respect to remaining discovery matters after the close of discovery were with respect to outstanding discovery matters only. Plaintiffs also assert that they were diligent in pursuing discovery and defendants have refused to engage in discovery in good faith. But even if those general arguments had merit, which the record does not bear out, they provide no justification for why plaintiffs did not move to reopen fact discovery until three months after it had been closed. Furthermore, plaintiffs' contention that Judge Mason "myopically focus[ed] on purported deficiencies in Plaintiffs' discovery requests and the manner in which Plaintiffs attempted to bring them to the Court's attention, with little regard for the substantive interests at stake," (Pls.' Objections at 6), is utterly without merit. It is plaintiffs' job, not that of the courts, to craft their own discovery requests and arguments on motions, and to bring those requests and motions in a timely manner. Plaintiffs assert that Judge Mason's ruling was "rendered in a vacuum," (id.), but it appears that it is plaintiffs who would have the Court ignore their actions, or lack thereof, during the discovery process. Plaintiffs also contend that as a matter of law, it is improper to close discovery prior to the filing of an answer, but they cite no authority for that proposition, and it is rejected. In any event, this Court concurs with Judge Mason, who denied plaintiffs' motion without prejudice and acknowledged the possibility that defendants might raise affirmative defenses that could warrant reopened discovery.

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Plaintiffs' second objection is to the denial of their request to compel defendants to produce computer database information regarding aftermarket service agreements sold on or after March 25, 2000. In their objections, plaintiffs refer to Judge Mason's ruling as a "denial of Plaintiffs' request that Sears take the simple step of exporting the data in its computerized [service agreement] database in response to Plaintiffs' request for all documents concerning instances where [a service agreement] was issue[d] for a non-covered product." (*Id.* at 10.) As defendants point out, this characterization of the ruling does not correspond with the relief plaintiffs sought from Judge Mason; aftermarket service agreements are not the same as service agreements for non-covered products. Plaintiffs have failed to convince this Court that Judge Mason clearly erred in denying plaintiffs the specific discovery that they sought in their motion to compel.

Plaintiffs' third and final objection is to the "limitation of discovery based on the statute of limitations." (*Id.* at 12.) In May 2016, near the end of the fact-discovery period, Judge Mason determined that discovery dating back to March 25, 2010 was "reasonable and proportional to the needs of the Greenes' case at this time." (ECF No. 72, Order at 5.) Plaintiffs then repeatedly asked Judge Mason to reconsider that determination. This Court agrees with Judge Mason that plaintiffs have provided no compelling argument that discovery going back earlier than March 25, 2010 is warranted. Plaintiffs' arguments are cursory. For example, they concede that they have "proceeded on the assumption that" Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations applies to their contract claim, but argue that "a strong case can be made that it is Illinois' ten-year statute that actually applies." (Pls.' Objections at 15.) But they fail to develop that argument or their other arguments regarding the temporal scope of discovery.

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CONCLUSION

Defendants' motion to dismiss in part the First Amended Class Action Complaint [54] is granted as to defendant Sears Holdings Corporation, which is dismissed with prejudice as a defendant in this suit, and Count III, plaintiffs' ICFA claim, which is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants' motion is denied as to Count IV, plaintiffs' PCPL claim. The remaining defendants shall answer the remaining claims by April 17, 2017. The Court overrules plaintiffs' objections [116] to Magistrate Judge Mason's order of October 28, 2016. A status hearing is set for April 19, 2017 at 9:30 a.m.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 27, 2017

JORGE L. ALONSO United States District Judge

EXHIBIT 3

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

NINA GREENE and GERALD GREENE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff

V.

SEARS PROTECTION COMPANY, SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., and SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-CV-2546

Judge Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge [189] on Defendants' motion to exclude the purported expert opinions of Christopher Jackman [156] are overruled, and Defendants' Objections to the Report and Recommendation [191] on Plaintiffs' class certification motion [141] are sustained in part and overruled in part. No objections were made to the recommendation to grant in part Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the purported expert opinions of Mark J. Hosfield [177]. The Reports and Recommendations are adopted as discussed herein. Status hearing previously set for August 8, 2018 is stricken and reset to August 29, 2018, at 9:30 a.m.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs Nina Greene and Gerald Greene complain that from 1994 to 2014, they entered into and paid for several appliance-service agreements with the Sears, Roebuck & Company and Sears Protection Company (collectively "Sears" or "Defendants") that did not actually cover

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their products. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants breached their agreements, were unjustly enriched, and engaged in a deceptive business practice by selling "repair or replace" Master Protection Agreements ("MPAs") to Plaintiffs and a purported class for appliances Defendants had no intention of repairing or replacing. Plaintiffs moved to certify a nationwide class on their breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims, and a Pennsylvania class on their claim under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 P.S. § 201-1, et seg.

Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the parties' cross motions to exclude the opinions of each other's damages experts were referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Magistrate Judge issued two Report and Recommendations in which he recommended granting Plaintiffs' motion to certify, denying Defendants' motion to exclude the purported expert opinions of Christopher Jackman, and granting in part Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the purported expert opinions of Mark Hosfield. [Dkt 189, 191.] Before the Court are Defendants' objections to the recommendation to deny the motion to exclude Jackman's opinions, and their objections to the recommendation to certify the classes. [Dkt 192, 193.] This opinion assumes familiarity with the reports and does not repeat their descriptions of the relevant facts and legal arguments except as specifically necessary to address the Defendants' objections and consider the motions.

Standard of Review

The Court will set aside a Magistrate Judge's decision on "a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim or defense" only if it is "clearly erroneous or . . . contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The Court reviews de novo a Magistrate Judge's decision on a pretrial

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matter that is dispositive of a party's claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The Court of Appeals has observed:

De novo review requires the district judge to decide the case based on an independent review of the evidence and arguments without giving any presumptive weight to the magistrate judge's conclusion. The district judge is free, and encouraged, to consider all of the available information about the case when making this independent decision. A district judge may be persuaded by the reasoning of a magistrate judge . . . while still engaging in an independent decision-making process.

Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). Although the Magistrate Judge framed all of his decisions as recommendations, it is undisputed that the only dispositive issue before him was the class certification issue. Accordingly, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on that issue *de novo*, but views his remaining decisions as orders reviewable only for clear factual or legal error.

Defendants' Motion to Exclude Jackman's Opinions

Plaintiffs' claims are based on the central theory that Defendants engaged in a deceptive practice and breached their MPAs by selling policies for products which they did not cover. In support of their class certification motion, Plaintiffs offered the purported expert opinions of economist Christopher Jackman. Jackman opined based on data and information possessed by Sears that he could measure the damages of each purported class as a result of the conduct of which Plaintiffs complain. Specifically, utilizing historical versions of Sears' "Eligible Brands List," and other information, Jackman would identify products in an MPA dataset that were included as part of an aftermarket MPA sold by Sears but not eligible for coverage under the MPA. To determine damages, he would establish whether defendants issued refunds or credits for the products in the dataset, and subtract that amount from the MPA prices paid by customers

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for those products. Defendants moved to exclude Jackman's opinions, arguing his methodology is unreliable and based on speculation because it was their policy to always repair a product or offer a replacement or refund, and because it fails to account for Sears' provision of repairs. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying Defendants' motion, upon a finding that Jackman's methodology was reliable, and that Defendants' challenge to it was based on disputed facts.

Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on the same basic grounds upon which they previously argued. According to Defendants, it was error to find Jackman's methodology reliable because they say he cannot identify injured class members, and Sears' Eligible Brands List cannot be dispositive of breach. As the Magistrate Judge noted, however, Plaintiffs have their own interpretation of the evidence and what it reveals. Although Defendants assert that their challenge is to the sufficiency of the foundation of Jackman's opinions, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that it is at bottom a challenge not to the adequacy of the facts upon which Jackman relies but rather to the interpretation of those facts. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly emphasized, however, that "the court's gatekeeping function focuses on an examination of the expert's methodology. The soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert's analysis and the correctness of the expert's conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact, or, where appropriate, on summary judgment." Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) ("The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate") and Walker v. Soo Line R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2000) (court should not consider factual underpinnings of purported expert's testimony but should determine whether "[i]t was appropriate for [the expert]

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to rely on the test that he administered and upon the sources of information which he employed")).

Jackman's damages model is appropriately tied to Plaintiffs' theory of the case. *See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend*, 569 U.S. 27 (2013). It does not account for repairs under the MPAs because Plaintiffs assert such repairs are irrelevant to their allegations since Plaintiffs' claim is that breach occurred upon the sale of MPAs for uncovered products, not upon some later event. And in any event, Defendants misrepresent the record in arguing that Jackman had no method for accounting for class members who never requested service or who always got the service they requested. As Plaintiffs emphasize, Jackman's model explicitly considers class members who may have received replacements, refunds, and buyout offers [see dkt 142-20 at ¶¶ 22-23, 27-28, 31, 33], and Jackman testified that with access to Defendants' records of repairs, he could incorporate repairs into his analyses. [See dkt 157-1 at 98:02-99:21.] The Magistrate Judge appropriately weighed Jackman's report and testimony against the record. [Dkt 189 at 5-6.]

Defendants also argue that the Magistrate Judge erred by deferring merits issues essential to predominance. According to Defendants, the Magistrate Judge "simply determined that Jackman had a theory that might work for damages," and failed to determine if there were sufficient facts to support that theory. [Dkt 193 at 6.] To the contrary, the report and recommendation reflects a careful consideration of Jackman's methodology and the sources upon which it is based. [See dkt 189 at 3-4, 5.] In accordance with Daubert and its progeny, what the Magistrate Judge did not do was accept as dispositive defendants' version of the facts. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; Smith, 215 F.3d at 718.

Notwithstanding Defendants' argument, this case is not like *American Honda, Inc. v. Allen*, 600 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2010). In that case, the Seventh Circuit held it was error of the

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District Court to defer consideration and deny without prejudice a motion to exclude an expert's opinions supporting class certification despite the court's reliability concerns based on the expert's lack of empirical evidence, lack of peer review and inadequate sample size. Id. at 815. In vacating class certification, the Seventh Circuit explained that where a purported expert's testimony is critical to class certification, the District Court must conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert's qualifications or submissions prior to ruling on the issue of class certification. Id. at 815-816. Unlike in American Honda, here the Magistrate Judge did not decline to make the requisite analysis. Instead, he carefully weighed Jackman's methodology and the sources upon which he relied. Although Defendants insist that certain records are historically incomplete and that there are no other records upon which Jackman could incorporate repairs into his damage analysis, Jackman opines based on evidence including documents produced by Sears and deposition testimony to the contrary. [See dkt 151 ¶¶ 13-24, 30, 33.] This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendants' challenge to Jackman's opinions go to their weight, and not their admissibility. See, e.g., Smith, 215 F.3d at 718 ("The soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert's analysis and the correctness of the expert's conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact, or, where appropriate, on summary judgment."); Loeffel Steel Prods. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Accordingly, Defendants' objections are overruled.

Plaintiffs' Class Certification Motion

As set forth above, Plaintiffs seek to certify and the Magistrate Judge recommended certifying the following nationwide breach of contract and unjust enrichment class:

All individuals and entities who paid for aftermarket MPAs (including post-pointof-sale purchases of coverage, purchases of coverage for products bought from a 18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 Exhibit EXHIBIT A (part 2) - SRC Claim Pg 28 of 35 Case: 1:15-cv-02546 Document #: 200 Filed: 06/25/18 Page 7 of 18 PageID #:3572

retailer other than Sears, and/or subsequent renewals of coverage) for products which were not covered by nor eligible for coverage under the MPA, and did not receive a full refund.

Plaintiffs also seek to certify and the Magistrate Judge recommended certifying the following Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") class:

All residents of Pennsylvania who paid for aftermarket MPAs (including post-point-of-sale purchases of coverage, purchases of coverage for products bought from a retailer other than Sears, and/or subsequent renewals of coverage) for products which were not covered by nor eligible for coverage under the MPA, and did not receive a full refund.

Plaintiffs asserted that the relevant class period is March 25, 2000 to the present for the breach of contract claim, March 25, 2005 to the present for the unjust enrichment claim, and March 25, 2004 to the present for the UTPCPL claim. [Dkt 142 at 12.] Defendants opposed certification, arguing Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the class, the class definition is impermissibly broad, and individual issues defeat commonality and predominance. The Magistrate Judge largely rejected Defendants' arguments as challenges to the merits based on disputed issues of fact. Defendants object to the recommendation, arguing that the proposed classes fail to confirm to Plaintiffs' theory of the case, the claims are not supported by common issues and proof, and the claims are inappropriate for class adjudication given the predominance of individual issues. As to Plaintiffs' UTPCPL claim, Defendants further argue that the requirement that Plaintiffs establish justifiable reliance makes the claim inappropriate for class resolution. The Court undertakes *de novo* review.

To maintain a class action, Plaintiffs must identify a class and demonstrate that: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law

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or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that the proposed class meets one of the three conditions of Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs invoke Rule 23(b)(3) which requires them to show that "the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members," and that a class action is "superior to other available methods" to adjudicate the controversy fairly and efficiently. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Class Definition

At the threshold, Defendants assert that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that whether Plaintiffs' proposed class definitions fail to allege a legal injury is not an issue to be resolved at this juncture. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs' class definition does not conform to their theory of the case because it does not provide guidance on "who is aggrieved and belongs in the class based on Sears' action at the time of each MPA's formation." [See dkt 192 at 4.] Because Plaintiffs' class definition would include MPA holders who could have received some performance under their contracts, Defendants continue, Plaintiffs propose a "no-injury class" which should be rejected.

Defendants' argument, however, misunderstands Plaintiffs' theory of the case and description of the class. Plaintiffs' claims are focused on the premise that Defendants were unjustly enriched and breached their contracts by selling warranty coverage for products they could not or did not cover. Under Plaintiffs' theory, injury is inflicted upon purchase. Accordingly, the class Plaintiffs propose is tailored to include those people who bought what Plaintiffs call "illusory coverage." Under this theory, whether Defendants offered some repair or 18-23538-shl Doc 3170-3 Filed 04/12/19 Entered 04/12/19 12:38:29 Exhibit EXHIBIT A (part 2) - SRC Claim Pg 30 of 35 Case: 1:15-cv-02546 Document #: 200 Filed: 06/25/18 Page 9 of 18 PageID #:3574

buy-out in some instances are not issues defeating the correlation between Plaintiffs' claims and the class they propose. "Neither Rule 23 nor any gloss that decided cases have added to it requires that *every* question be common. It is routine in class actions to have a final phase in which individualized proof must be submitted." *Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc.*, 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014) ("If commonality of damages were essential, then class actions about consumer products are impossible." (Internal quotations omitted)).

Defendants also object that the Magistrate Judge did not impose a temporal component on the classes Plaintiffs propose, and that to the extent the Court is inclined to impose one, the time period Plaintiffs propose for their breach of contract claim is too long. Although a time period was not expressly incorporated into the class definitions recommended by the Magistrate Judge, the Magistrate Judge referenced the periods proposed by Plaintiffs in his other report issued that same day. [See dkt 189 at 4 n 2.]

As Defendants correctly observe, however, the limitations period on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim under Illinois law is 10 years, and under Pennsylvania law is shorter. Plaintiffs' unexplained request for a class period of 15 years is too long. Accordingly, Defendants' objection is sustained in this respect and Plaintiffs' proposed nationwide class definition is modified as follows:

All individuals and entities who paid for aftermarket MPAs on March 25, 2005 to the present (including post-point-of-sale purchases of coverage, purchases of coverage for products bought from a retailer other than Sears, and/or subsequent renewals of coverage) for products which were not covered by nor eligible for coverage under the MPA, and did not receive a full refund.

Plaintiffs' proposed UTPCPL class definition is modified as follows:

All residents of Pennsylvania who paid for aftermarket MPAs on March 25, 2004 to the present (including post-point-of-sale purchases of coverage, purchases of coverage for products bought from a retailer other than Sears, and/or subsequent

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renewals of coverage) for products which were not covered by nor eligible for coverage under the MPA, and did not receive a full refund.

Numerosity

Plaintiffs contend that the anticipated size of the class and the difficulty of joining all members meet Rule 23's numerosity requirement, and Defendants do not appear to disagree.

The Court agrees that this standard is met.

Commonality

Plaintiffs contend that they meet the requirement of commonality because common questions exists across the purported class such as whether Sears sold "illusory coverage," or MPAs on products for which it did not and could not provide coverage. According to Plaintiffs, the determination of the truth or falsity of this common question will resolve a core issue common to the class. Defendants insist that commonality cannot be met because it is both not true that Sears made categorical decisions about whether certain products were covered under the MPAs, and because there are myriad of individual reasons why a product might not have been repaired or replaced. The Magistrate Judge rejected Defendants' arguments, finding that although the proposed class could include people who received some repair or replacement under their MPAs, because Plaintiffs' proposed damages methodology takes that into account, commonality is nevertheless demonstrated. While acknowledging the factual variations Defendants emphasize, therefore, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Defendants' arguments about performance were not a reason not to certify, but rather, were merits-based arguments based on Defendants' defenses to Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants object, repeating the argument that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate commonality because a breach cannot be established at the point of sale but only upon individualized analysis of the reasons why a particular consumer was denied service. Defendants stress that MPAs were sold for a variety of products and in a variety

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of circumstances, and thus they say, the claims are not suitable for class determination.

According to Defendants, it was error not to rule on the merits of their assertions.

Rule 23(a)(2) requires Plaintiffs to show that "there are questions of law or fact common to the class." As the Supreme Court explained in *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, this requires a showing that class members have suffered the same injury, and that their claims depend upon some common contention. 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011). While merits questions may be considered to some extent on a certification motion, as Defendants argue, they may only be considered "to the extent . . . that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied." *Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds*, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013); *accord Schleicher v. Wendt*, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010). "[T]he court should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits." *Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem*, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012).

Notwithstanding Defendants' objections, this Court agrees that Plaintiffs demonstrate a commonality of issues consistent with their theory of breach, unjust enrichment, and consumer fraud. Whether Sears sold policies for products that it did not and could not cover is a central question common to the class, and capable of proof at trial through common evidence. Defendants' insistence that they had no such policy, that MPAs are variable, and that Sears ultimately provided some performance under some consumers' MPAs does not defeat this common contention. *See Schleicher*, 618 F.3d 685 ("Defendants have approached this case as if class certification is proper only when the class is sure to prevail on the merits. That would resurrect the one-way intervention model that was ditched by the 1966 amendments to Rule 23. Under the current rule, certification is largely independent of the merits . . . and a certified class can go down in flames on the merits"). "Every consumer fraud involves individual elements of

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reliance and causation. . . . [A] rule requiring 100% commonality would eviscerate consumerfraud class actions." Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 759. Where, as here, the purported fraud is based on alleged conduct that was uniform as to all class members, it is well established that individual issues of reliance do not thwart class actions. See Kramer v. Am. Bank & Tr. Co., N.A., No. 11 CV 8758, 2017 WL 1196965, at *6 (N.D. III. Mar. 31, 2017).

Plaintiffs point to evidence of a common course of conduct supporting claims applicable to the class, and propose a damages methodology applicable to the class that takes into account issues regarding the provision of repairs or something less than a full refund. Because Plaintiffs' claims raise common questions susceptible to common proof across the class, they meet this component of the Rule. See Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756 ("Where the same conduct or practice by the same defendant gives rise to the same kinds of claims from all class members, there is a common question."). Whether Plaintiffs will ultimately prove that Sears had the coverage position they assert is an issue to be determined another day. See Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 800 F.3d 360, 376-77 (7th Cir. 2015) (plaintiffs need not prove existence of employer policy requiring off-the-clock work to establish commonality, but only that issue is capable of common proof).

Typicality

Typicality requires that the claims or defense of the representative parties be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs say their claims are typical of the class because they allege and must prove that they entered into MPAs and paid for coverage on products they say were never actually covered. Plaintiffs complain that they were misled into purchasing "illusory coverage," their payments conferred a benefit on Sears, and that Sears wrongfully kept those benefits. Defendants challenge these assertions, arguing that

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because Plaintiffs obtained repairs on some products under their policies, and declined an offer for a cash buyout on still others, their claims are not typical of the class and Plaintiffs would not adequately represent the class.

"The question of typicality in Rule 23(a)(3) is closely related to the preceding question of commonality." *Rosario v. Livaditis*, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). A plaintiff's "claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members" and is "based on the same legal theory." *Oshana v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, typicality "may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members,' [since] the requirement 'primarily directs the district court to focus on whether the named representatives' claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large." *Kramer*, 2017 WL 1196965, at *6 (quoting *De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.*, 713 F.2d 225, 233 (7th Cir. 1983)). In this instance, Plaintiffs' claims arise from the same alleged course of conduct as those belonging to the class and Plaintiffs base their claims on the same legal theory as the claims belonging to the class. Despite any factual variances in the products listed in the MPAs or going to the claimed damages as a result of some repair, their claims have the same essential characteristics.

Adequacy

This inquiry "consists of two parts: (1) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs as representatives of the proposed class's myriad members, with their differing and separate interests, and (2) the adequacy of the proposed class counsel." *Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc.*, 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011).

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Defendants do not contest the adequacy of class counsel but challenge Plaintiffs' adequacy for largely the same reasons they oppose typicality. Plaintiffs assert that they have been injured as a result of the sale of MPAs on non-covered items and the lack of a full refund. According to Plaintiffs, they therefore share an interest with the class in proving their claims and resulting damages. This Court agrees. That Plaintiffs received a partial refund may affect their damages, but it does not exclude them from the class. Because Plaintiffs' claims are based on the same legal theory as those of the class, typicality is satisfied.

Predominance

As mentioned above, under Rule 23(b)(3), a class may be certified only if questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over questions affecting only individual members of the class. This requirement is met when a common nucleus of operative facts and issues underlies the claims brought by the proposed class. See Messner, 669 F.3d at 815. "Predominance of issues common to all class members, like the other requirements for certification of a suit as a class action, goes to the efficiency of a class action as an alternative to individual suits." Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2012). It is a qualitative, not a quantitative concept. Id.

As discussed above, Plaintiffs assert that common questions capable of class-wide resolution include such central issues as whether Sears sold MPAs for products it did not cover and whether the terms of the MPAs provide Defendants with a defense. Plaintiffs contend that because they provide a damages model that reliably calculates class-wide damages flowing from the claims that they press, the individual issues upon which Defendants focus do not defeat the predominance of common questions of law or fact. According to Defendants, on the other hand, coverage determinations are fact-intensive and individual, thereby defeating predominance.